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Opinion: Washington wants its own rules for killer robots, not the world's

As 128 nations meet in Geneva this week to decide whether to start binding treaty talks on autonomous weapons, the United States is simultaneously fast-tracking its own military's adoption of the same technology — a contradiction that undercuts its claim to be acting responsibly.

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By PressTemps World DeskPublished Today, 19:50 ET · 6 min
Opinion: Washington wants its own rules for killer robots, not the world's
The Council Chamber at the United Nations Office in Geneva, where UN disarmament bodies meet. Illustrative image; not a photo of this week's CCW Review Conference specifically. Photo: U.S. Mission Geneva / Eric Bridiers, via Wikimedia Commons, CC BY 2.0.
What to know
The UN's CCW Seventh Review Conference is meeting in Geneva Nov. 16-20, 2026, to decide whether to launch binding treaty negotiations on autonomous weapons, after the US and Russia weakened the expert group's draft text in September.
Seventy-six states, including 70 CCW members, now back opening formal negotiations — the strongest support such a move has drawn inside the convention, per Human Rights Watch.
The US argues existing humanitarian law is sufficient, even as a June 2026 White House memorandum (NSPM-11) orders the Pentagon to speed adoption of AI and revise its own autonomy-in-weapons directive within 90 days.
The Red Cross is proposing a narrow, two-tier regulatory approach, not a blanket ban, modeled on the CCW's earlier preventive ban on blinding laser weapons.

Diplomats from the 128 states party to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons are gathered this week at the Palais des Nations in Geneva for the treaty's Seventh Review Conference, a once-every-five-years meeting that will decide whether the world finally begins negotiating binding rules for autonomous weapons. The session, running through Friday under the Swiss presidency, follows three years of expert talks on what the treaty calls lethal autonomous weapons systems and what everyone else calls killer robots. It deserves more attention than it is getting, because the outcome will shape whether machines are ever permitted to select and kill human targets without a person in the loop.

The stakes are not hypothetical. Drones that loiter over a battlefield and strike without a human pressing the final button already exist in prototype and early deployment form, and the war in Ukraine has accelerated their use. The United Nations Secretary-General and the president of the International Committee of the Red Cross warned in a joint appeal this past August that the world is "dangerously close to crossing a moral red line: the autonomous targeting of humans by machines." That is not the language of an abstract ethics seminar. It is a warning from the two institutions most responsible for the laws of war, issued because the diplomatic process meant to head off that outcome has been quietly gutted.

A weakened text, a narrowing window

The expert group tasked with drafting the elements of a future instrument finished its work on September 5 after years of sessions, producing a "rolling text" that the Netherlands, as chair, had spent years assembling through the painstaking consensus process the UN's disarmament body describes in its own briefing on the process. In its final days, that text was stripped of some of its sharpest teeth. According to Human Rights Watch, which tracked the closing sessions, the United States and Russia pushed through late changes that narrowed the text's scope from international law generally to the narrower body of international humanitarian law, dropped references to the design and development stage of these weapons, cut language on ethical considerations, and removed requirements for predictability, reliability, explainability and traceability. Defense News reported that American diplomats made formal approaches to at least six countries to build support for that weaker position, and that India and Turkey joined Russia in backing it.

Even so, the political momentum has not collapsed. Seventy-six states, including seventy of the convention's own voting members, now back opening formal negotiations on a legally binding instrument, which Human Rights Watch calls the strongest support such a move has ever attracted inside the CCW. The question before this week's conference is whether that majority can translate into an actual negotiating mandate, or whether a determined minority holding veto power over consensus can keep stalling.

Washington's double standard

The American position in Geneva — that existing humanitarian law already covers these weapons and a new treaty is unnecessary — would be easier to credit if the same government were not simultaneously racing to put more autonomy into its own arsenal with less oversight. In June, the White House issued National Security Presidential Memorandum 11, directing the Pentagon to accelerate the adoption of artificial intelligence across the national security enterprise and to revise its decade-old directive governing autonomy in weapon systems within 90 days, with annual reviews thereafter. That directive, last updated in 2023, is the single internal document that defines how much independence an American weapon is allowed before a human must intervene. Fast-tracking its revision while resisting any international check on the same technology is not a neutral position. It is a bet that the United States would rather write its own rules alone than negotiate shared ones that might also bind rivals such as Russia and China.

That bet is shortsighted. A state that helps build the global rulebook gets to shape its definitions, its verification mechanisms and its exceptions. A state that simply opts out leaves that work to others, or to no one, while the technology proliferates anyway — not just to Washington, Moscow and Beijing, but eventually, as arms-control history shows, to smaller states, insurgent groups and criminal organizations that will face no domestic directive at all.

The case the holdouts are not answering

The Red Cross is not asking for a blanket ban, a point its critics often elide. Its proposal, laid out in its own advocacy paper to delegates, is a two-tier approach: prohibit only the narrow category of unpredictable systems and those built specifically to target people directly, and impose restrictions — on target type, geographic scope, duration and scale — on everything else. That is a modest, workable ask, and it has precedent. The same convention's Protocol IV banned blinding laser weapons in 1995 before they ever became a battlefield staple, a preventive move that cost militaries little and is now treated as unremarkable. Nothing in the current proposal would stop any state from building precision-guided munitions, loitering interceptors or defensive systems that keep a human genuinely in command of lethal decisions.

"We are now dangerously close to crossing a moral red line: the autonomous targeting of humans by machines."

The standard objections deserve a direct answer rather than a dismissal. It is true that a treaty will not bind every state, and that Russia's record on compliance with existing arms-control commitments gives little confidence. But the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions were never joined by every major power either, and both still reshaped battlefield norms, stigmatized the weapons they covered and gave victims' advocates and courts a legal benchmark that did not exist before. Verification is harder for software than for landmines, but that is an argument for building verification tools into a treaty now, while the technology is still young, rather than waiting until it is everywhere and unregulated by design.

What should happen now

The Review Conference runs through Friday, and the realistic outcome is a negotiating mandate with a modest timeline rather than a finished treaty. That would still be progress, and the American delegation should support it rather than continuing to run interference for a non-binding alternative that asks states to take Washington's word that the laws of war are sufficient. Congress, which has already shown interest in autonomous-weapons oversight through recent defense-authorization provisions, should use its leverage over the Pentagon's forthcoming revision of its autonomy directive to insist on exactly the safeguards — human judgment requirements, predictability standards, clear accountability — that American diplomats are working to strip from the international text. Credibility on this issue cannot be split in two. A government that wants a voice in deciding how the world regulates autonomous weapons has to be willing to accept some of those rules at home first.

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